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A DEFECT IN CURRENT POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE fact that political philosophy has its roots in the past carries certain consequences. In the first place, it follows that the present situation cannot be fully understood without reference to the premodern State: but, on the other hand, the nature of the premodern State must not be taken as fixing the character of the modern State. A consideration of the premodern State as it appeared to the great writers on political theory may therefore be of use not only in tracing origins, but also in bringing out what is peculiar to modern States. The facts that (1) the interdependence of modern States within the modern State system affects the character of each State, and that (2) the modern State excludes religious and other activities, render this contrast necessary.*

There have been, obviously, many different kinds of State, however we are to classify them; and the abrupt division into modern and premodern must be understood to be in some sense an arbitrary one. This being granted, we shall speak first of the segregation or isolation, and next of the absolutism or inclusiveness, of premodern States; especially in so far as those features were recognized and supported by political theory.

The Greek City-State was not in fact all that Plato and

* [A short description of these characteristics of modern States will be found in Mr. Delisle Burns's book on *The Morality of Nations*.—Ed.]

Aristotle imagined that it was or hoped that it might be.¹ In speaking of their conceptions, therefore, we shall have to make some reference to the facts that do not quite support them. But, for our present purpose, their conceptions are even more important than the facts; since their political theory has so largely influenced even our modern practice.

The three expressions of Plato's idea of the *πόλις*, in the *Republic*, the *Statesman* (with some part of the *Gorgias*) and the *Laws*, contain slight differences. It is clear, however, with regard to the leading idea in every case, that the *πόλις* is to be as far as possible self-sufficing: the difference in the three great conceptions of the *πόλις* is due only to the lessening importance in the later works of complete isolation. The classes in the *Republic* are intended to make the State self-sufficing.² Let us suppose, then, that all its ideas, all its energies, and all its supplies come to the community from its own citizens or subjects. There is, however, a warrior class among the citizens, for the Guardians are not simply administrators. But there must be, then, some human beings outside the *πόλις*. It is not generally noticed that Plato does not even hint at who they are, how they may be conceived to be organized, or what they may be supposed to be doing. They are merely "outsiders"; and the purpose of one class or section of a class in the *πόλις* as it ought to be, is to keep them off. And yet, even on the assumption that the State has nothing to gain by contact with them, their activities must surely make some difference to the structure or actions of even the ideal *πόλις*. This is simply omitted.

¹ The glaring omissions of Plato and Aristotle are noted in Newman's Introduction to Aristotle's *Politics*. There was interdependence in Hellas (games, music, drama, philosophy, "Homer," etc.) and there was even the beginning of interstate structure.

² *Rep.*, 374a: *τί δέ; ἡ δ' ὅς. αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί*; And Socrates answers that we want all the "arts" in our city.

In the *Statesman* the warriors still have a place;³ but apparently there *was* a time when there was no need of them, according to the myth of the "backward" life.⁴ Probably, if there was a πόλις in existence then, its features would be the reverse of the essential features of the πόλις of this world. But for practical purposes, again, the State seems to need no goods or ideas from the outer world.

In the *Laws* the utility of some communications outside the frontiers of the πόλις is grudgingly admitted,⁵ but only under strict surveillance. Thus in his old age Plato seems to have acknowledged that Athens owed much to non-Athenians: or perhaps he felt that men were too weak to be inhabitants of his Republic.

The same fundamental attitude is to be found in Aristotle, in spite of the fact that he had studied many States. It is astonishing that he did not see the importance of the connections between States. But he, too, abruptly announces that it is the essence of the πόλις to be αὐτάρκης,⁶ and that, he says, "must be the State which is all-producing, for to have all things and to want nothing is self-sufficiency." Aristotle probably saw that the actual πόλις of his day was partly isolated and partly dependent upon foreigners: and he quite seriously maintains that in so far as it aimed at τὸ εὖ ζῆν it was isolated or segregate.⁷ But in practice, the State not being altogether isolated, some reference had to be made to those who did not belong to *the* πόλις or who might belong to other πόλεις. We arrive, then, at Aristotle's view of foreign interests and foreign policy. It is childish. It reduces itself to the idea that, negatively, the

³ *Politicus*, 309.

⁴ *Pol.*, 270 et seq.

⁵ *Laws*, 950a, 951a.

⁶ *Pol.*, 1252b.

⁷ *Pol.*, 1326b, 27: τοιούτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παντοφύρον. τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς αὐτάρκης.

⁸ *Pol.*, 1252b et seq.

government ought not to rely on foreign aid,⁹ and that, positively, the legislator should have an eye to neighbors.¹⁰ Presumably he may gain something from them; but his essential attitude is thus expressed: "A πόλις must have a military force serviceable against her neighbors and not merely useful at home. . . . A πόλις should be formidable to enemies."¹¹ Conquest is not to be the purpose of the State; but one of the reasons given is striking—it is because the State "happy in isolation" is the ideal,¹² and this in defiance of the fact that Greek States differed from barbarian precisely in their interstate structure and that Athens in particular owed her art and her science to foreign contact.

Even such a summary is enough to show how utterly inapplicable to the modern State system the political observations and ideals of Plato and Aristotle are. This does not involve any lack of appreciation for the exactness and brilliance of their dissection of society, so far as it went; but their influence has been so great that later writers have not been able to see how impossible it is to accept their views even of the *internal* structure of the State as applicable to a situation in which the *external* structure has so modified the whole issue. Even if the Greek πόλις was comparatively isolated, the modern State certainly is not.

When we pass to the Roman theorists, the same limited point of view seems to be prominent; for although nearly all late Republican and early Imperial history is a history of foreign influences, the thinkers still concentrate on the

⁹ *Pol.*, 1294b.

¹⁰ *Pol.*, 1325a: καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτονίαντες, πότα πρὸς πολέους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον.

¹¹ *Pol.*, 1265a, 19 et seq. An attack on Plato's *Laws* which accuses Plato of neglecting foreign relations, but implies that the essential foreign relation is that of war. Nevertheless, Aristotle here states the fundamental idea that you cannot consider the nature even of the ideal State without reference to those who do not belong to it.

¹² *Pol.*, 1325a, 1: ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἂν καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων: and for the ideal, 1325b, 31 et seq.

internal structure of the State.¹³ Rome in fact dealt with other States as equals (Latin League, etc.) until the time of Trajan; but this hardly affected theory. The *jus gentium* was never a law of corporate national bodies or groups but of individuals. And, in any case, even if this summary statement seems misleading, the influence of Rome has largely rested on the idea that Rome was a World-State. Outside its boundaries was a political wilderness: although beyond the wilderness, almost unknown to the Romans, were China and India, which were later to show that there never has been in fact a World-State. The Rome which became the model for future ages was the Rome of imagination, which was falsely supposed to owe nothing to the political structure of other States and produced an organization which was falsely supposed to include the whole human race.

In the Middle Ages it ought to have been obvious that each of the supreme political units (*regna*) was influenced in structure and action by contact with the others. But the isolated theocratic kingdom of the Old Testament¹⁴ and the Aristotelian πόλις so influenced men that they could not see facts clearly. Thus Aquinas regards it as an evil, however necessary it may be, that there should be many *regna*.¹⁵ More original minds saw more clearly. Pierre Dubois recognizes at least the possibility of interstate structure in his suggestions as to an International Council of Conciliation, a board of arbitrators and the avoidance of war.¹⁶ At about the same date (1305) John of Paris argues

¹³ Polybius's contribution, the balance of forces within the State, etc., (*Hist.*, Bk. VI) has no bearing on the foreign policy of Rome. Cicero seems to have vaguely felt that Rome was peculiar in her treatment of foreigners: but clearly there was no conception of interstate political structure (cf. *Pro Balbo*, Chs. XII and XIII).

¹⁴ For this influence see Carlyle, *Mediæval Political Theory*.

¹⁵ *S. Theol.*, Ia, IIae. q. CV. art. 1. ad 3. multitudo regum magis est data in poenam quam ad eorum perfectum.

¹⁶ In the unpublished "De abbreviatione guerrarum" and in the "De recuperatione Terre Sancte" (Coll. des Textes). See my article in *The Monist*, January, 1917.

that political power must be divided, since "the sword" requires a restricted space for its effectiveness:¹⁷ but there is no clear conception of interdependence. William of Ockham stands apart in this as in other issues. He suggests a representative council of all nations, "all civilized human beings forming one group."¹⁸ And in the work of Nicholas de Cusa, after the Conciliar theories of Church government had developed, a useful contact between races for common purposes is recognized.¹⁹

Here was the possibility of a new view of State structure when the Renaissance began. Political necessity, however, caused centralization, dynastic power and the abolition of the indefinite medieval unity. The result was that, although many States were now recognized to exist and to influence one another—a great step beyond Plato and Aristotle—the influence was thought of in purely negative terms. It was the influence of opposition and not co-operation. Machiavelli argues not merely that States are independent but that they are necessarily opposed. For, among other things, "expansion" is essential to the State.²⁰ His *Discorsi* are commentaries on Livy and what he supposed was Roman history. The Rome of his imagination was his evidence for the essence of the State.²¹ It is interesting, then, to perceive the true origin of the idea of *necessary expansion*. It has nothing to do, of course, with the

¹⁷ Joh. Paris. (in Goldast's *Monarchia* S. R. I.), "De Pot. Regali et Papali," Ch. III: "Non est necesse omnes principes ad unum reduci, sicut ministros Ecclesiae ad unum supremum." Temporal powers must be divided because (1) men differ in body more than in mind, (2) the sword (legal sanction) requires limited space for its effectiveness, and (3) diversity of climate causes *diversi modi vivendi*.

¹⁸ *Dial.*, Ch. 84. "Omnis populus et omne corpus quod absque consensu vel auctoritate cuiuscumque qui non est de corpore potest sibi jus statuere, potest aliquos eligere qui vicemgerant totius communitatis....Sed omnes fideles sunt unum corpus....Ergo," etc.

¹⁹ Cf. "De Concordantia Catholica," summarized in Dunning, *History of Political Theory*, and "De Pace Fidei," in my book on *Political Ideals*.

²⁰ *Disc.*, I, 6: "La necessità la conducesse ad ampliare."

²¹ *Disc.*, II, 4.

later excuse for it—"surplus population": it is due to the Machiavellian idea, based on a misreading of history, that one State is naturally hostile to another.

Hobbes asserts that the State is in "a state of nature" with respect to any other State; and this is defined as "the Warre of every man against every man." "In all times Kings and Persons of Sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continuall jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators. . . which is the posture of war."²² As between States there is no "just and unjust." "Where no common power, no Law; where no Law, no injustice. Force and Fraud are in warre the two Cardinall virtues."²³ Hence foreign policy is to "weaken their neighbours,"²⁴ and the less contact with foreigners the citizens are allowed, the better it is for the State.²⁵ To continue with the English school, Locke is inclined to the same idea of opposition, but he makes two important changes, (1) in distinguishing the state of nature from the state of war,²⁶ and (2) in pointing out that progress depends on not leaving force in the hands of the interested parties in a dispute.²⁷

In the later Renaissance Grotius recognized the interdependence of States,²⁸ but did not explain it. Nor did he base any argument upon it except the possibility of avoiding famine, revolution or foreign war. The author says that no one has dealt with the moral relationship between States, and he straightway begins to discuss war. Peace is given a vague blessing on the last page of his work: for opposition seemed to be the only obvious and

²² *Leviathan*, II, 13.

²³ *Lev.*, I, 13.

²⁴ *Lev.*, II, 29; II, 17.

²⁵ *Lev.*, II, 29.

²⁶ *Civil Government*, II, iii, par. 19.

²⁷ *Civil Govt.*, II, par. 89. This has an immense possibility of development (cf. below Ch. X) but Locke does not seem to have seen how important it was.

²⁸ *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, Prol. 21: "Nulla est tam valida civitas quae non aliquanda aliorum extra se ope indigere possit." He implies much in the proposal to make or create a connection. The connection was there, actually influencing the nature of States.

essential contact. But a great step was made by the establishment of an idea of International Law and a morality on which that law depended. It is only astonishing that the theories of international law, perhaps because they were obstructed by the obsolete conception of sovereignty in such a man as Bodin, made so little difference to the conception of the nature of the State. The same difficulty obscures the attempts of the Abbé St. Pierre.

At a later date one would have imagined that the international culture of the eighteenth century would have made theorists elaborate an interstate structure, but even Rousseau leaves the subject with a sentence at the end of the *Contrat Social*:²⁹ and yet, if one omits the discussion of "external" relations the whole idea of the State is vitiated. Rousseau, however, saw that the relations between the States of Europe, based upon the similarity of their customs and laws, could be made political. He says in the "Extract" that, in fact, a permanent state of war degrades States. War is not an occasional accident, it is the fundamental institution in the relation of States,³⁰ but he conceives as possible a political unity—a Confederation of Europe.³¹ In one fragment he says, "J'ai trouvé que les liaisons qui subsistent entre tous les puissances ne laisseront jamais à aucune d'elles le temps et la sûreté nécessaire pour refondre sa constitution."³² But on the whole he does not give sufficient place to the influence of other States on the government of each. Kant, under the influence of Rousseau, elaborated a scheme of European confederation; but even he does not define the State by reference to its external contacts. He recognizes, however, that an interstate struc-

²⁹ "...il resterait à l'appuyer par ses relations externes."

³⁰ Vaughan, *The Political Writings of Rousseau*, I, 304, "L'état de guerre."

³¹ Vaughan, *op. cit.*, I, 374. The whole magnificent "Extract" (Vaughan's *Rousseau*, I, 364) is in statement of political observation hardly to be surpassed, even though Rousseau does not allow enough, as it seems to me, to the beginnings of interstate political structure.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 321.

ture would have some effect on the internal constitution of the several States.³³

The Napoleonic wars which intervened, blocked the development of political thought, setting back political structure as war did at the Renaissance; so that Hegel in his *Philosophy of Mind* dismisses the whole of interstate relationship in one short paragraph (par. 547). He speaks as if there were nothing in it but what he calls "the game of war." In the *Philosophy of Right* a few meager sections are given to the relations between States.³⁴ The only foreign relationship discussed is war, which is blandly assumed to be "necessary" (par. 324) to preserve the individuality of the State, and even to be good. The principle, he says, is drawn from history. And what he meant by history may be perceived in his assertion (pars. 355-360) that "world development" shows the four great empires—the Oriental, Greek, Roman and German!

But Hegel lived in a primitive atmosphere. The great changes have occurred since his day. Let us, then, turn to the moderns. The English utilitarians seem to have imagined that the military organization of States could disappear without any growth of interstate structure: and their followers in practical politics stood for the idea of leaving "foreign" States alone. But this, though a step forward from contact which is mere opposition, would eventually lead back to the primitive segregation. And in any case the tendency to slur or omit the discussion of foreign relations was pernicious. Even Sidgwick, although he admits (in a note!) that foreign contacts affect domestic policy, devotes only five out of thirty-one chapters to interstate structure.³⁵ But the idealist school was much worse. Bluntschli divides the *Philosophy of the*

³³ *Perpetual Peace*, par. II, art. 2.

³⁴ "External Sovereignty" (pars. 324-329) and "International Law" (pars. 330-340).

³⁵ *El. Pol.* (ed. 1897), note p. 237.

State into (1) The State in General, (2) the State in Action, and (3) the State in Ideal. But he goes so far as to say that *the* State is "humanity organized, so as not to break up particular States," and that "only in the universal empire will the true human State be revealed" (English trans., p. 32). This implies that one can define the nature of a State without reference to its external relations. Again, he writes of sovereignty (Bk. VII) as though there were no such thing as the influence of foreign States on the administration of law and government.

Green is almost the only writer who develops at all the idea of the moral relationship between States. In his *Principles of Political Obligation* he deals with this issue.³⁶ He sees that the nature of the State is dependent on its relation with other States (par. 167 et seq.). "The source of war between States," he says, "lies in their incomplete fulfilment of their function, in the fact that there is some defect in the maintenance or reconciliation of rights among their subjects." Again, "War is a survival from a condition in which the State, in its full sense, was not" (par. 172). But even he gives comparatively little space to this, and the weight of his argument rests on the old discussion of the relations between citizens of one State.

Bosanquet, in his *Philosophical Theory of the State*, entirely omits the external relations of the State. The result is that his theory reads like a theory of the lungs with all reference to the air omitted. But it may be that he does not mean by the State what is ordinarily meant by it.³⁷

³⁶ *Works*, Vol. III, reprinted in separate volumes, 1895, pars. 157-175, in lecture K.

³⁷ In the *Elements of Politics* by S. Leacock (ed. 1914), Part I, Chapter VI, is supposed to deal with interstate relations. It is said that "viewed in a purely theoretical light every State is an absolutely independent unity. Its sovereignty is unlimited" (p. 89); which only shows that the theory has no basis in modern fact. In Part III, Ch. III, of the same work we are supposed to hear of the modern State, and all the treatment is of State regulation of economic forces.

Jellinek (*Das Recht des modernen Staates*) refers to international associations (p. 116), to international law and to modern as opposed to the old sovereignty; but the atmosphere of the book is still that of the isolated State. He recognizes that the new situation *ought* to make a difference to theory (p. 722): "Schon an diesem Punkt kann man sehen, wie selbst die losen und doch dauernden Verbindungen zwischen den Staaten, die durch Verwaltungsverträge gegründet werden, auf die Lehre vom Staate selbst ihre Wirkung äussern. Jene Fassung des Souveränitätsbegriffes, die ihn mit dem Merkmal absoluter Schrankenlosigkeit der Staatsgewalt identifiziert, ist mit der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit der durch ein System der Verwaltungsverträge gebundenen Staaten unvereinbar." But this is only a very inadequate recognition of facts which would, if given their right value, disprove most of what is contained in the remainder of the book.

We have not attempted a history of Political Theory; but the selection of names is sufficient to show the immense weight of tradition in representing the State as essentially isolated or segregate. This *may* have been true at some date; but it certainly is not now. And we have implied that in so far as it was not or is not true, even the consideration of *internal* State structure is vitiated.

When we turn to the other great feature of the modern State, the limitation of its functions to what we call politics, in cooperation with a complex of other institutions for maintaining civilized life, we find the same contrast in all descriptions of the premodern State, descriptions which, again, were only partly true even of their contemporary facts and are wholly untrue of our own time.

It is recognized that the *πόλις* was as much a Church as a State, in our sense of the words; and, whatever may have been the attitude of the Sophists, the devotional phrases of Plato and Aristotle leave no doubt as to (1)

what they thought it was, and (2) what they wanted it to be. Both desired an "authoritative revelation" from a "parochial Sinai,"³⁸ an all-inclusive institution to maintain an all-embracing regulation of life.

Plato in the *Republic* simply assumes that the πόλις is equivalent to the whole of society and not merely to what we call the State. Therefore the classes in the πόλις symbolize the whole nature of man.³⁹ And the argument of the *Republic* as a whole would not be valid if "political" justice had to Plato's mind the special reference to what we call politics. Hence also Plato makes the problem concentrate on education,⁴⁰ and in the *Statesman* seems even to identify "politics" with education,⁴¹ which has meaning only if "politics" indicates the whole science of all kinds of social life. Every activity of man is therefore subordinated to the πόλις, a situation impossible in any modern "State."

Aristotle asserts that the πόλις is the highest and all-inclusive institution or organization of life.⁴² But that, applied to the modern State, makes nonsense, as it would make nonsense to say that man is a "political" animal in translating the phrase πολιτικὸν ζῶον. For that phrase means that "man naturally organizes his social life," and not that man has only what we call a State. Like Plato,

³⁸ The phrases are Newman's to whom it will be obvious that I owe much of what I have said concerning Plato and Aristotle; cf. W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Introduction, and notes *passim*.

³⁹ *Rep.*, 368e et seq.: δικαιοσύνη, φαιμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ πῶς καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; and the conclusion in 441a: καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ξυνοίχων αὐτὴν τρία ὄντα γένη, χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρητικόν, βουλευτικόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, κ.τ.λ. Cf. also *Rep.*, 443 et seq. From this and similar passages I should be inclined to maintain that the *Republic* is really not a Utopia, but a first attempt at what we call "Social Psychology."

⁴⁰ *Rep.*, VII, *passim*.

⁴¹ *Politicus*, 306 et seq.

⁴² *Pol.*, 1252b 27: ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἤδη, πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.

Aristotle identifies the "politician" with the educator:⁴³ and this again in defiance of the fact that organizations of all kinds were growing up and making the actual πόλις departmental.⁴⁴

Since we are speaking chiefly of the influence of theory and since Rome provided no new philosophical idea on this subject, we may dismiss her abruptly. But the influence of *legal* theory and practice more than reinforced the absolutism of the Platonic-Aristotelian πόλις. The Roman conception of order implied subordination and not coordination. The "Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus" is an indication of the Roman tendency to make the State absolute over all interests:⁴⁵ and the inclusiveness of the *civitas* is to be seen in the complete subordination of other institutions (*collegia*, etc.), which has had an overwhelming effect upon the idea of the State in medieval, Renaissance and modern law.

In the Middle Ages, if we regard the Empire as the most important type of State, the simplification of functions is extreme, at least in theory; all power or organization depending on either Pope or Emperor. But in fact the politicians of the Middle Ages depended largely upon the Old Testament, latinized, in the words *rex* and *regnum*. The function of the State was, however, distinguished from that of the Church; and there was the beginning of a coordination of institutions. Again, here the men of the Middle Ages seem to deserve more credit for political perception than it is usual to give them. But they did not go far enough. Trade guilds and universities were conceived to "depend" for existence upon either State or Church:

⁴³ *Pol.*, III (VIII), init. 1337a: τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παίδεαν. This does not mean: "There should be State education," but "The *practical social philosopher* should concern himself with education first."

⁴⁴ The philosophical schools, for example, the religious brotherhoods and the artistic societies.

⁴⁵ Livy, XXXIX, 18, cf. my *Political Ideals* (3d ed.), pp. 66 et seq.

and all medieval thinkers were confused by their attempt to reconcile what they knew of the *πόλις* and the Roman *civitas* with the *regnum* and *Imperium*.⁴⁶ Thus the first beginnings of coordination and of a development away from absolutism or inclusiveness were easily destroyed in the Renaissance.

The anarchic tendencies of private judgment in the Reformation led the saner reformers to exalt the power of the State. Both Luther and Zwingli tended to reaction in this matter, because of the danger of a dissolution of all organized society. The time for coordinating institutions had not come: one or the other had to suffer, and the Church became a department of State: not, however, without an effort in the other direction. Calvin, attempting to keep the two functions distinct, may have made the State into a church: but Roger Williams (and he is a type of others) goes so far as to say that "church and civil government are not inconsistent but *independent*."⁴⁷

The current, however, set strongly toward absolutism. In Bodin, in spite of his idea of "sovereignty," we find a recognition that other institutions than the State existed before the State.⁴⁸ The right conclusion is not drawn; for we are told that other communities now owe their existence to the State. Numa, says Bodin, established *collegia* in Rome, and the Romans suppressed the Bacchic society. So the dead hand covers the eyes of a great man. Grotius engagingly declares the State to be the "perfect" community, whatever that may mean.⁴⁹ Machiavelli justifies all means for the preserving of the "State," but never

⁴⁶ This confusion is well described in Gierke (*Pol. Theory*, etc., Eng. trans. p. 96) and may be seen operating in a great man in Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's *Politics*.

⁴⁷ *The Bloody Tenet*, Ch. 83.

⁴⁸ "Le mot de Communauté est commun à la famille, au collège etc. *De la République*, Bk. 1, Ch. 8. Cf. my *Political Ideals*, p. 135.

⁴⁹ *De Jure*, etc., I, 1, 14, "Civitas est coetus perfectus."

dreams of advocating moral or immoral extremes for any other institution:⁵⁰ and in this again he is arguing from the devotion to the State in his purely imaginary Rome. Hobbes writes that "a Church is the same thing with a Civil Commonwealth";⁵¹ and against the maintainers of "spiritual" institutions, he says that both laity and clergy "depend on the Civil Sovereign." Other institutions than the Church are hardly mentioned.

The theorists of the French Revolution were all governed by the Renaissance and Enlightenment in the amount of the functions they attributed to the State. The destruction of the theocratic basis for power and its dynastic embodiment left the absolute and all-inclusive State still untouched. The State took over many of the illegitimate powers of the king. Even Rousseau, who cannot be said to have loved absolutism, says that man was wild and endangered, and, looking about for safety, found—the State!⁵² The State is defined as "une forme d'association . . . par laquelle chacun s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse qu'à lui-même et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant." So also the Revolutionary declaration of August 18, 1792, says, "L'Etat ne doit souffrir dans son sein aucune corporation." The result in modern times was the suppression of religious associations, which, whether justifiable or not, was based on an antiquated idea of State "inclusiveness."

To pass to later times, war once again weakened all social development, and Hegel in the *Philosophy of Right* makes the State the highest society. It is not clear whether he includes in it all institutional functions. Of other institutions only the family is adequately treated. In the *Phi-*

⁵⁰ *Lev.*, III, 10; cf. Part II, 29.

⁵¹ *Disc.*, III, 41: "Dove si delibera al tutto della salute della patria, non vi debbe cadere alcuna considerazione nè di giusto nè d'ingiusto." It will be noticed that the State for emotional appeal becomes "la patria": but many peoples have a "patria" who have not a State of their own.

⁵² *Contrat social*, I, 6.

losophy of Mind (par. 546) he says that "the state of war shows the omnipotence of the State": and he reduces the Church to "the Protestant State" (par. 549)! Wallace, his translator and interpreter, tells us (p. cciv, Clarendon Press edition) that this is "professorial socialism," and that the culmination of "the Spirit," whatever that is, is "the supremacy of the eternal State." But, I confess, "the Spirit" takes the whole matter completely out of my ken: so that I shall say no more of Hegel.

The Hegelians are amusing. Bluntschli devotes a chapter to the chief differences of the Modern State from the Ancient and Mediæval.⁵³ There is the barest reference to other institutions, and their international character is not recognized: he speaks as if the State were highest and best of all, and adds the ludicrous nonsense that the State is a masculine and the Church a feminine institution, presumably because of the German language! Bosanquet is absolutist in the Hegelian sense: and he goes so far as to say that in art, philosophy and religion social relations are not prominent!⁵⁴ These are apparently exercises of the free individual: but perhaps here also we have some of the mysterious workings of the Hegelian Spirit.

It is well known that the English tradition of the nineteenth century was against State absolutism; but it was mistaken from our present point of view, because it contrasted the State with the unorganized and uninstitutionalized individual. This was a vital mistake, not only in conceiving a plan of action but even in the perception of fact, for what is to be contrasted with the State is not the individual, but (1) other associations for other purposes, and (2) society as a whole.

The evil tradition of atomic individualism has affected even modern political thought on the limits of State power.

⁵³ Bk. I, Ch. VI.

⁵⁴ *Phil. Theory of the State*, in fine.

Hence Sidgwick, who corrected most of the mistakes of Mill and Spencer, speaks as if in the case of divided allegiance, even recognizing voluntary associations, the State must be the aggrieved party.⁵⁵ He has some insight, however. Churches, he says, supply needs "which it would be desirable for Government to supply, if it could do so effectively," which we may take to be a recognition of the departmentalizing of "politics" in modern times, for it is implied that the State cannot be a church and, one may suppose, neither can it be a trading company. But Sidgwick does not seem to recognize that men are, in fact, united by institutions for other than political purposes across the frontiers of State or nationality.

In Germany Jellinek subordinates the Church in his opposition to "Dualismus".⁵⁶ he recognizes the importance of international associations, but not with reference to a division of social functions. Eucken, however, has protested against the Hegelian State. "The spontaneity and the wealth of life suffer from the tendency to increase the power of the State. . . . The State is inclined to look upon science and art and chiefly religion and education, especially with regard to that which they achieve for the aims of the State. . . . The Germans especially have much to do in this matter and there is much at stake."⁵⁷ As certain of their own prophets. . . . we need say no more.

Enough has been said to show that the increasing complexity and diversity of institutions other than political have not been reflected in political theory: nor has any philosophical theory of the State allowed for the immense difference this must make even to purely political facts.

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⁵⁵ *El. Pol.*, Ch. 28 (ed. 1897), p. 577.

⁵⁶ *Op. cit.*, Ch. 10, par. 5.

⁵⁷ *Life's Basis* (Eng. trans., p. 359).